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Abstract
We introduce a model for uncertainty in the IS-LM linear macroeconomic
model with exogenous parameters. An uncertainty profile U is a short and
macroscopic description of an stressed situation. We use U to define a
strategic game where two agents, the angel and the daemon, act selfishly
and have different goals. Those Nash equilibria provide the stable strategies
in stressed situations, giving a natural estimation of risk. We apply this
analysis to a linear version of the IS-LM model and analyse the structure of
the Nash equilibria in some particular games.
1. Introduction
Knight (1921) made a distinction between risk and uncertainty (see also
Akerlof, Schiller (2009), Chapter 11): “Risk refers to something that can be
measured by mathematical probabilities. In contrast, uncertainty refers to
something that cannot be measured because there are no objective stan-
dards to express probabilities.” We explore a way to transform uncertainty
into risk by modelling stressed uncertain situations by an strategic situation
among two agents and use game theory to analyse those models. We pro-
pose a simplified way to model uncertain situations through an uncertainty
profile U . A profile U gives a short and macroscopic description of the po-
tential stress of an economic system, together with the a description of an
strategic situation where two agents, the angel a and the daemon d have op-
posite goals. Uncertainty profiles were introduced in Gabarro et al. (2014)
to analyse Web orchestrations under stress in uncertain situations.
We are interested here in extending the approach to the InvestmentSavings-
LiquidityMoney (IS-LM), introduced in Hicks (1937) (see also Baldani et al.
(2007)) providing a way to express, in equilibrium, the national income and
the interest rate as a a function of several exogenous parameters. Our mo-
tivation comes from the fact that one of the limitations in the IS-LM model is
the lack of risk. Hicks (1980-1981) wrote that “there is no sense in liquidity,
unless expectations are uncertain".
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You can imagine a as the government and d as the people, the unions or
the crude reality, those agents can act by stressing some of the exogenous
parameters of the system in a positive or negative way. This point of view
is far from being unique, in southern Europe many citizens believe just the
opposite. Thus by considering different uncertainty profiles we can model
different situations. This give us a possible algorithmic interpretation of the
Keynesian animal spirits1 in macroeconomics: animal spirits (a and d) are
players in a strategic game.
We consider a linear approximation of the IS-LM model, present the global
framework of analysis and analyse the Nash equilibria of the resulting a-d
for some simple uncertainty profiles. In the studied cases, both a and d
have limited capability to act over the exogenous parameters. The paper is
structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the IS-LM model. In Section
3 we model the behaviour of the whole set of exogenous parameters under
stress. In 4 we introduce uncertainty profiles and the associated a-d games
tailored to the linear IS-LM model and analyse the Nash equilibria of some
cases. In particular We prove that adding uncertainty to any fiscal policies
generates strategic situations in which there is always a a dominant strategy
equilibria. Finally, in Section 5 we raise some lines for future research.
2. The InvestmentSavings-LiquidityMoney (IS-LM )
We recall here the definition of the IS-LM model, which deals with equilib-
rium states and is given by two equations. The first equation, the IS (Invest-
mentSavings) line, describes the equilibrium points in the market of goods
and services. The second equation, the LM (LiquidityMoney) line, repre-
sents the equilibrium points in the money market.
The IS line, Y = C(Y − T ) + I(r) + G, gives an accounting identity where,
Y is the national income, Y , r is the interest rate, the remaining parameters
are the sum of the annual rates of spending: C by consumers, I(r) by the
investors (as a function of the interest rate), and G by government G.
The LM line, M/P = L(r, Y ), expresses the fact that the money supply
M/P , where M is the money and P the price leve,l is given by the liquidity
preference L(r, Y ) which is a function of the national income Y and the
interest rate r (see Keynes (1936) pag 166).
An equilibrium point (Y, r) is a pair solving the system. This pair (Y, r) gives
the point where both markets are on mutual equilibrium.
We consider a linear approximation of the IS-LM model taking C(Y − T ) =
a+ b(Y − T ), I(r) = c− dr and L(r, Y ) = eY − fr. Those expressions leads
to a set of exogenous parameters E = {a, b, c, d, e, f, T,G,M, P}. The set of
endogenous variables {Y, r} can be expressed, in equilibrium, as a function
of the parameters. The parameters and their constraints are the following:
1“Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of
which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal
spirits - a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a
weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities” (Keynes
(1936) pages 161-162). Look also at Akerlof, Schiller (2009), Part One.
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autonomous consumption 0 < a interest sensitivity for real money 0 < f
marginal propensity to consume 0 < b < 1 taxes 0 < T
exogenous investment 0 < c exogenous government spending 0 < G
interest sensitivity 0 < d price index 0 < P
income sensitivity for real money 0 < e
The IS line Y = Y (r) is obtained from Y = C(Y −T ) + I(r) +G = a+ b(Y −
T ) + c − dr + G. The LM line r = r(Y ) is obtained from M/P = eY − fr.
Thus Y = (a + c + G − bT − dr)/(1 − b) and r = (eY − M
P
)/f . Solving the
linear system Y = Y (r), r = r(Y ) we obtain the following equilibrium point
(Y, r) where g = (1− b)f + de:
Y =
f
g
(a+ c+G− bT ) + d
g
M
P
and r =
e
g
(a+ c+G− bT )− (1− b)
g
M
P
As (Y, r) depends on E , when needed we write (Y (E), r(E)).
Example 2.1. Consider the following valuation or the set E :
a b c d e f T G M P
200 3/4 200 25 1 100 100 100 1000 2
We get, Y = 1700− 100r, r = Y/100 + 5 and solving Y = 1100, r = 6. 2
3. Stress model for the IS-LM model
We assume the existence of two adversary agents called the angel a and the
daemon d. Those agents act at the same time attempting to stress the model
by altering the values of some of the exogenous parameters of the linear IS-
LM model. A stress model for E is a tuple of pairs S = ((δa(e), δd(e)))e∈E
describing the perturbation that can be applied to the parameter. The per-
turbation values are real numbers, so they can be either positive or negative.
Example 3.1. Let us give an example of a stress model S:
agent a b c, d, e, f T G M P
a 0 +1/20 0 0 +50 0 0
d 0 0 0 +50 −25 0 +1
The angel a has the (potential) capability to act upon the parameters {b,G}.
The marginal propensity to consume could be increased from 3/4 to 4/5.
This is modelled by δa(b) = 1/20. The government spending G could be
increased by δa(G) = 50. For any other e ∈ E \ {b,G}, the agent a has no
possibility to act upon and therefore δa(e) = 0. The daemon d has the follow-
ing (potential) capability to act upon some of the parameters in {P, T,G}.
The price of money could increase by δd(P ) = 1. Taxes could increase
δd(T ) = 50. The G spending could decrease by δd(G) = −25. For any
e ∈ E \ {P, T,G}, δd(e) = 0. 2
Let us define the transformation of the exogenous parametres under stress
model S. when a has decided to exert stress capabilities on a ⊆ E and d has
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decided to exert stress capabilities on d ⊆ E . For any e ∈ E , the stressed
version of e under (a, d) denoted as stressS(e)[a, d] is defined as follows:
stressS(e)[a, d] =

e e /∈ a ∪ d
e+ δa(e) e ∈ a \ d
e+ δd(e) e ∈ d \ a
e+ δa(e) + δd(e) e ∈ a ∩ d
Finally the equilibrium point is (Y (stressS(e)[a, d]), r(stressS(e)[a, d]). When
S is clear from the context, and we want to emphasize the role of the choice
of parameters (a, d) we note (Y (a, d), r(a, d)).
Example 3.2. We continue with Example 2.1 and S given in Example 3.1 for
(a, d) = ({b}, {P,G}). Writing the new values as e′ = stress(e)[{b}, {P,G}]
we note stressS(E)[{b}, {P,G}] = {a′, b′, c′, d′, e′, f ′, T ′, G′,M ′, P ′} and:
agent choice a b c d e f T G M P
200 3/4 200 25 1 100 100 100 1000 2
a a = {b} +1/20
d d = {P,G} −25 +1
a′ b′ c′ d′ e′ f ′ T ′ G′ M ′ P ′
200 3/4 + 1/20 = 4/5 200 25 1 100 100 100− 25 = 75 1000 2+1=3
Consider for instance the computation of b′. As b ∈ a\d = {b}\{P,G} = {b}
we have b′ = b+ δa(b) = 3/4 + 1/20 = 4/5. The obtaiined equilibrium point is
Y ({b}, {P,G}) = 28700/27 ≈ 1062.96, r({b}, {P,G}) = 197/27 ≈ 7.29. 2
4. Uncertainty profiles and a-d games in the IS-LM model
An a priori (global and macroscopic) view of the IS-LM model E in a stressed
environment S with uncertainty is modelled by an uncertainty profile U intro-
duced in Gabarro et al. (2014). In U = 〈E ,S,A,D, bA, bD, uA, uD〉, A and D
are subsets of E which may be stressed. The analyser has the perception
that when an angelic parameter in A is perturbed this is unlikely to have
a serious impact (not malicious behaviour). In contrast when a daemonic
parameter in D is perturbed this may well have catastrophic implications
(malicious behaviour). The spread of the stress is modelled by bA and bD.
The effects are measured by a utility functions uA and uD. Given U a strate-
gic situation arises when the IS-LM model is subjected to combined angel
and daemon actions.
An uncertainty profile is a tuple U = 〈E ,S,A,D, bA, bD, uA, uD〉, where S is a
stress model for E , A ∪D ⊆ E and bA ≤ #A and bD ≤ #D.
A a-d strategic game (the a-d game) associated to the uncertainty profile U
is given by Γ(U) = 〈{a, d}, Aa, Ad, ua, ud〉 where {a, d} are the angel and the
daemon players. The player actions are Aa = {a ⊆ A | #a = bA} and
Ad = {d ⊆ D | #d = bD}. The utilitites are ua = uA and ud = uD.
Example 4.1. Let us continue with Example 3.2. We assume that having
high income is good and high interest rate is bad. Then we obtain the bi-
matrix game Γ(〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, Y, r〉):
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ad
{P,G} {P, T} {T,G}
{b} 1062.96 , 7.29 1029.62 , 6.962 1233.33 , 22/3 ≈ 7.33
{G} 1066.66 , 22/3 ≈ 7.33 1041.66 , 7.08 1075 , 5.75
The PNE are ({G}, {P,G}) ({b}, {T,G}) with different values for Y and r. 2
It is well know that any strategic game has a Nash equilibrium so from the
a-d game, the stable stressed situations are described by the strategies of
the players in the Nash equilibria. In the following we analyze the properties
of such equilibria for some particular cases.
A case of fiscal policy under uncertainty. Consider the case where a and
d have the capability to act over G and T , that is Aa = Ad = {{G}, {T}} and
ua = Y and ud = r (as in Example 4.1). We ask if the addition of uncertainty
can generate a unstable situation where each agent is trying to catch the
other and no PNE exists. Theorem 4.1 shows a negative answer.
Theorem 4.1. Given U = 〈E ,S, {T,G}, {T,G}, 1, 1, Y, r〉 where the stress
model S verifies is δa(x) = δd(x) = 0,for x /∈ {T,G}, it holds that Γ(U) has
always a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Proof Sketch. In Γ(U) the sets of actions are Aa = Ad = {{T}, {G}} and
ua(a, d) = Y (a, d), ud(a, d) = r(a, d). Defining µT,T = −b
(
δa(T ) + δd(T )
)
,
µT,G = δd(G)− bδa(T ), µG,T = δa(G)− bδd(T ) and µG,G = δa(G) + δd(G) game
Γ(U) is :
a
d
{T} {G}
{T} Y + (f/g)µT,T , r + (e/g)µT,T Y + (f/g)µT,G, r + (e/g)µT,G
{G} Y + (f/g)µG,T , r + (e/g)µG,T Y + (f/g)µG,G, r + (e/g)µG,G
it can be proved that ({G}, {G}) is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Considers a variation where d acts as before but a can act over a or M .
Theorem 4.2. Let U = 〈E ,S, {a,M}, {T,G}, 1, 1, Y, r〉 where S is
agent a b, c, d, e, f T M G P
a δa ≥ 0 0 0 δM ≥ 0 0 0
d 0 0 δT ≥ 0 0 δG ≤ 0 0
it holds that Γ(U) has always a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Proof Sketch. The following a-d game Γ(〈E ,S, {a,M}, {T,G}, 1, 1, Y, r〉) has
dominant strategy equilibriums:
a
d
{T} {G}
{a} ua = Y +
f
g (δa − bδT )
ud = r +
e
g (δa − bδT )
ua = Y +
f
g (δa + δG)
ud = r +
e
g (δa + δG)
{M} ua = Y +
1
g (
d
P δM − fbδT ),
ud = r − 1g ((1− b) δMP + ebδT )
ua = Y +
1
g (
d
P δM + fδG),
ud = r − 1g ((1− b) δMP − eδG)
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A case giving zero-sum games. Given k > 0 consider the reduced utility
u(a, d) = Y (a, d) − kr(a, d) and let U = 〈E ,S,A,D, bA, bD, u〉. Then ua =
−ud = u and Γ(U) is a zero-sum. By similar techniques we have.
Theorem 4.3. Given U = 〈E ,S, {T,G}, {T,G}, 1, 1, u〉 being S
agent a, b, c, d, e, f T G M,P
a 0 δT ≤ 0 δG ≥ 0 0
d 0 δT ≥ 0 δG ≤ 0 0
if (f − ke)δ = 0 the a-d game has four PNE otherwise it has only one PNE
either in ({T}, {T}) or in ({G}, {G}).
5. Further developments
We are working towards understanding the structure of the Nash equilibria
of a-d games in more complex situations. Varian (1977) has studied the sta-
bility of the IS-LM model. As (Y (a, d), r(a, d)) can be seen as perturbations
of the equilibrium point (Y, r) if will be of interest to study the relation of both
models. Our preliminary result point out that it seems workable to apply the
methods in this paper to others parametrized econometric models.
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